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Dated 2015, written in 2026. Reconstructed from notes and posts from that period rather than published at the time. The thinking is what I had then; the sentences are new.

When your supply side outgrows you

The best people on the marketplace stop needing the marketplace. That's not churn. It's the business model reaching its ceiling.

3 min readmarketplaces · exposely · disintermediation

There's a pattern I've watched enough times now to stop calling it bad luck.

A creator joins Exposely with a decent audience and no idea what they're worth. They do a few deals through us. The deals go well. Brands start contacting them directly. They get a manager, or they become someone worth a manager's time. And then they stop listing.

They haven't churned in any meaningful sense. They graduated. And we did the graduating for them.

The uncomfortable arithmetic

Every marketplace takes a cut for solving a matching problem. The value of solving that problem is highest when the seller has no other way to be found, and it declines steadily as the seller becomes findable on their own.

Which means the moment a seller becomes most valuable to us — real audience, proven results, brands actively want them — is roughly the moment we become least valuable to them. Our best inventory is our least retainable inventory, and the mechanism that makes them good is the same mechanism that makes them leave.

I don't think this is a flaw in how we've built it. I think it's the shape of the category. Any marketplace whose supply consists of individual people with portable reputations has this problem. The reputation is the asset, the asset is theirs, and the platform is a phase they pass through.

The bad answers

I've considered all of these and I want them written down so I don't quietly slide into one.

Exclusivity clauses. Contractually prevent creators from dealing direct. This works right up until someone offers them a better deal, at which point you find out that a contract with an individual who has other options is a suggestion. It also makes you the enemy in a market where your reputation with supply is most of your acquisition.

Hiding the counterparty. Anonymize the brand, run everything through us, don't let them build a relationship. Some marketplaces genuinely do this and it works in categories where the transaction is commodity. Ours isn't. The whole product is a good match between two specific parties who then have to work together closely. You cannot build trust between people you're preventing from meeting.

Becoming their agent. Follow them up-market and take a bigger cut of a bigger deal. This is the most tempting one because it's the most obviously profitable, and it converts us into the agency I spent two years refusing to become. Also I'd be competing with actual talent managers who are much better at that job than I am.

What I think the real answer is

The graduates aren't the business. The business is the flow.

If the median creator's productive life on Exposely is eighteen months, then the company is worth something if and only if we can keep filling the top of that pipe faster than it drains. That's not a retention problem, it's an acquisition problem wearing a retention costume, and I've been solving it as the wrong one for about a year.

The second thing, which I like better: the long tail doesn't graduate. Someone with 15,000 engaged followers in a specific niche is never going to be worth a manager's time and will never be findable by a brand without something like us. They'll do smaller deals. They'll do them for years. That's a worse business per transaction and a much more durable one, and it's the part of the market that the agencies structurally cannot serve.

I built this pointed at the top of the market because that's where the impressive names are. The impressive names are exactly the ones who leave.

What I'd want to know

Whether the long tail transacts often enough to matter. I don't have that number in a form I trust, which is its own indictment after nearly three years. If it does, we should reorient the whole product around people who will never outgrow us. If it doesn't, then this is a business that requires constantly refilling a leaking bucket, and I should be honest with myself about what that's worth.

That's the question for next year. It might be the question.

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If this was useful or you think I'm wrong about it, tell me: @dennishegstad.

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